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PART III: PUBLIC LAW
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
by
Robert P. Davidow*
THIS survey of Texas Criminal Law and Procedure consists of a rather
detailed discussion of nine areas in which there have been numerous decisions during the past year. The topics are presented in a somewhat arbitrary order, although an attempt has been made to deal first with those items
which are clearly procedural, and secondly with those items that have both
procedural and substantive aspects. The word "court," unless qualified explicitly or by context, has been used throughout to refer to the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals.
I.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

A.

Consent Searches

Although it is now clear from the United States Supreme Court's recent
decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte' that a person whose consent
to search is sought need not be advised of his right to refuse consent, the
determination of whether consent has been voluntarily given is still a difficult one to make in some cases. In Papraskar v. State2 appellant's wife
was advised that she need not consent to a search. Thus, that which was
not required in Bustamonte was nevertheless present in this case. However,
the court found an absence of consent because of other circumstances present:
In the instant case, the undisputed evidence shows that appellant's wife
was not only under arrest, but had been physically abused and surrounded by a veritable posse of armed officers prior to the request for
her consent to search. Her request to see her husband or to have the
matter of consent referred to him was denied. Assuming she was informed she could refuse to consent, she was also told that if she did
not consent, the officers would get a search warrant and that a Justice
of Peace was
standing by on the Jacksboro Highway to do just that
3
if necessary.
By contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied on the assumption that notification of the right to withhold consent was
not necessary to a valid consent in upholding a consent search in United
* A.B., Dartmouth College; J.D., University of Michigan; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. The research for this Article was
supported in part by Texas Organized Research Funds.
1. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
2. 484 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
3. Id. at 738.
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States v. McCann.4 Here appellant, while driving his car, was stopped by
a detective. In response to a question whether he would mind whether the
detective looked in his car, appellant replied, "No, sir, I don't."5 The
search in McCann was complicated by the fact that the evidence sought to
be suppressed was not found merely in the car proper, but rather in a briefcase in the front seat of the car. The question raised by the appellant was
whether the consent to search the car included consent to search the briefcase. The court, however, without much elaboration, concluded that the
consent did extend to a search of the briefcase.
B.

Stop and Frisk

State6

In Jones v.
two Dallas policemen in an unlighted squad car approached five men standing in a circle behind a restaurant. When they
turned their lights on the group they observed one of the men drop a matchbox and another a billfold. The officers found marijuana in both the matchbox and the billfold, and upon searching the men further, also found marijuana in the shirt pocket of the defendant. On appeal from a conviction
for possession of marijuana, the court held that the original detention of all
five men was proper under Terry v. Ohio7 and that the finding of marijuana
in the matchbox and billfold was probable cause for appellant's arrest. There
are several problems with this analysis. First, in Terry the Court authorized
a seizure for the purpose of a protective search for weapons. The Court
emphasized that such a seizure was authorized when the policeman had reasonable cause to believe that the person whom he was investigating was
about to engage in a crime of violence.8 Clearly no crime of violence was
suspected in Jones. Furthermore, the more recent case of Adams v. Williams,9 in which the United States Supreme Court applied the principle of
Terry to the seizure of a weapon from a person seated in an automobile,
does not aid the Texas court here. In Adams, although a narcotics offense
was suspected, the policeman who removed the weapon had also been told
specifically by the informer that the person whom he was investigating was
armed. In addition, there was in Jones substantial doubt that the police
even had a reasonable suspicion of a crime when two of the five individuals
dropped a matchbox and a billfold respectively. Apart from the question
of police fabrication raised by this now familiar "dropsy" testimony, 10 a billfold is surely not the kind of object that gives rise to a reasonable suspicion
of anything. It is apparently true that a matchbox is often used in connection with marijuana possession, but it is equally true that persons who smoke
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

465 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 152.
493 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 28.
407 U.S. 143 (1972).

10. For a consideration of the possibility of police fabrication in "dropsy" cases,
i.e., cases in which officers have testified that defendants have dropped narcotics to the
ground after they have been confronted by police officers, see, e.g., Comment, Police
Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Casea: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971).
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lawful tobacco also carry matchboxes. Moreover there was nothing unusual
about a group of men meeting at 11:45 p.m. behind a cafe.
Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the principle of Terry applies to
drug cases in the absence of evidence of the possession of weapons, and further 'that the police officer had a reasonable basis to stop the individuals
when he saw a matchbox drop to the ground (and therefore that the detention was appropriate), it does not follow that the arrest of appellant was
lawful once marijuana was discovered in the matchbox and the billfold.
There was no testimony that marijuana was in plain sight; on the contrary
the testimony was that the marijuana was inside the matchbox and the billfold. Thus, there was no indication that appellant knew that the marijuana
was in the matchbox and the billfold. Moreover, there was no evidence
as to the content of any conversation among the five individuals. For all
the arresting officers knew, the five suspects might have been "discussing
the world series."1 1 And, as Sibron v. New York makes abundantly clear,
mere association with drug users does not constitute probable cause for ar12
rest.
C. Search of Everyone PresentDuring Execution of Search Warrant
In Hegdal v. State8 appellant unsuccessfully claimed that an affidavit for
a search warrant was insufficient. The search warrant was executed at a
house occupied by one Bobby Wright in Lubbock where the appellant was
merely one of those present. The police officers searched everyone present.
The question arises whether the execution of a search warrant justified the
search of, and presumably seizure of contraband from, all those who happened to be there even though they were not shown to be in control of the
premises. The issue is very similar to that raised in Terry v. Ohio14 and
Sibron v. New York. 15 If mere association or conversation with known addicts does not furnish a basis for either probable cause for arrest or reasonable suspicion that would permit a "stop and frisk," then it is difficult to
see how the practice of searching everyone who happens to be present at
the time a search warrant is executed can be justified.' The situation
would have been different if the persons present had been using narcotics
or if the officers had smelled marijuana in the air. Such, however, was not
the case in Hegdal.
D. License Check
State17

In Black v.
and Leonard v. State's the court of criminal appeals
upheld seizures of drugs in 'plain view following the stopping of the two
11. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62 (1968).

12. Id. at 62-63.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

488
392
392
For
491
496

S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
U.S. 1 (1968).
U.S. 40 (1968).
a general discussion of this problem, see 58 CORNELL L.
S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

REV.

614 (1973).
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motor vehicles for a "license check" as ostensibly authorized by Texas law. 19
The facts in the Black case illustrate the extent to which the court is willing
to go in order to permit the police to stop and to seize whatever is in plain
view following the stop. The officer on patrol testified that he stopped the
car for a driver's license and registration check because the car had outof-state license plates and because he observed that the occupants of the
car appeared to be nervous and were looking at each other and attempting
to look back at him. This was not a case in which the police situated themselves on the side of the road and stopped every car or a random selection
of cars for the purpose of checking drivers' licenses. 20 Rather, the officer
singled out Black's car because of his allegedly peculiar demeanor, and the
officer's reliance on the statute authorizing license checks seems to have
been merely a pretext. The affirmance of the conviction in Black seems
inconsistent with the requirement of reasonable suspicion as elaborated in
Terry v. Ohio21 and Sibron v. New York 22 for cases in which a stop may
be authorized in the absence of probable cause. Terry makes clear that
2
unarticulated suspicion will not do. 3
It is difficult to see how Black and Leonard can be reconciled with Terry
and Sibron, unless stopping an automobile is materially different from stopping and frisking a pedestrian. Certainly no opinion of the United States
Supreme Court lends support to that conclusion. 24 The Court has struggled
with the automobile situation in cases where there was probable cause for
arrest or search, and the Court has dealt in such cases with the question
whether there was a need for a warrant.2 5 There seems to be no reason
to permit the stopping of a vehicle without probable cause in situa19. "Any peace officer may stop and detain any motor vehicle operator for the
purpose of determining whether such person has a driver's license as required by this
Section."

TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b, § 13 (Supp. 1973).

20. It is not completely clear that a routine stop for a license check or other administrative purposes is constitutional. In Commonwealth v. Swanger, 300 A.2d 66,
68 (Pa. 1973), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute which purported to give a peace officer the power to stop a vehicle "'for
the purpose of inspecting the said vehicle, as to its equipment and operation, or manufacturer's serial number or engine number, and securing such other information as may
be necessary.'" But cf. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
21. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
22. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
23. "And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from
the facts in the light of his experience." 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
24. In the recent case of United States v. Robinson, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d
427 (1973), the United States Supreme Court upheld a full search incident to a full
custody arrest for a traffic offense. As Mr. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion indicates, probable cause for stopping the appellant on April 23, 1968, for failure to have
an operating license resulted from a routine spot check stop of the appellant's car on
April 19, 1968. That may have been a reference to a license check; however the issue
is not fully discussed by any of the Justices, since "[iit was assumed by the majority
of the Court of Appeals, and is conceded by the respondent here, that Jenks [the police
officer] had probable cause to arrest respondent, and that he effected a full custody
arrest." Id. at 470, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 432.
25. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Even in United
States v. Robinson, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973), there was probable cause
to arrest the driver of the vehicle for a traffic offense. Thus, there was never any
doubt about the authority under the fourth amendment to effectuate an arrest.
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tions which would not justify a forceable stop of a pedestrian. To reach
the contrary conclusion is 'to view the fourth amendment as having little or
no application to automobiles.
E. Plain View
In Spencer v. State2 6 a police officer stopped an automobile driven by
appellant because of loud mufflers. Under the most recent Supreme Court
decisions in the area of automobile arrest, United States v. Robinson27 and
Gustafson v. Florida,28 presumably ,an officer would be authorized to conduct
a search incident to that arrest, at least if there had been a full custody
arrest resulting in a trip to the police station. 29 In the instant case, however,
the court did not rely on the theory of search incident to arrest in upholding
the seizure of suspected drugs. Instead, the court relied on the fact that
the seizure of a brown bottle which fell to the ground as appellant got out
of the car and a matchbox which apparently fell from the right rear door
of the automobile resulted from these items having been in plain view. The
court did not discuss the related question whether there must be probable
cause to believe that the thing in plain view was contraband. In the case
of the matchbox, there might have been some remote suspicion that the
matchbox contained contraband, but it is difficult to see how there could
have been probable cause to believe that the matchbox contained marijuana
when a matchbox is so commonly carried by smokers. Since the car was
stopped for a traffic offense, there was no good reason to believe that the
matchbox contained marijuana; there may have been a possibility, but this
is far from a probability. With respect to the brown bottle, the officer determined that it contained "one red capsule and two clear capsules in which
there was a whitish brown substance which appeared to the officer to be
heroin."' 0 Presumably red capsules and clear capsules are not unusual
items, since they often are used for medicinal purposes. It is not indicated
that the officer used any chemical test to determine the substance; he apparently relied only on the color. There was no testimony that the officer
had had prior experience with substances of this sort so that he could be
considered an expert; neither was there testimony that the color of heroin
is distinctive enough to permit the officer to distinguish it from other drugs.
F. Officer's Awareness of "High Crime Area" versus Officer's Personal
Knowledge Regarding the Defendant
In Talbert v. State83 the court reversed a conviction of possession of mari26.
27.
28.
29.

489 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973).
Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973).
"The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals also discussed its understanding

of the law where the police officer makes what the court characterized as 'a routine
traffic stop,' i.e., where the officer would simply issue a notice of violation and allow
the offender to proceed. Since in this case the officer did make a full custody arrest
of the violator, we do not reach the question discussed by the Court of Appeals."

S. Ct. at 477 n.6, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 441 n.6.

30. 489 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

31. 489 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

94
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juana because of the erroneous admission into evidence of marijuana seized
when an automobile was stopped in a "high crime area." The court refused
to accept the description of "high crime area" which included the entire university area of Austin in order to justify the stop.32 This decision in Talbert
seems inconsistent with the decisions in Black and Leonard.88 It is hard
to see why, on the one hand, driving in a nebulously defined high crime
area is not probable cause for stopping, while on the other hand driving with
a nervous demeanor is. In the latter cases the officers were held to have
acted lawfully because they relied on the license check statute, whereas in
the former case there was apparently no such reliance. Both types of stops
would seem to be equally in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
The Talbert case is to be contrasted with Lerma v. State, 4 in which the
court upheld a conviction of possession of heroin, despite the introduction
into evidence of heroin seized when the -appellant was seen by an officer
through binoculars in front of a lounge, taking a small paper packet from
his pants pocket and beginning to pass it to another individual in apparent
exchange for a sum of money. At this point the transaction was interrupted
when an officer, relying in part on his personal knowledge that appellant
was a user of heroin and that the lounge was a place frequented by drug
addicts, drew his pistol and ran towards the ,appellant and the other individual. The only exceptional circumstance in this case was that appellant
looked cautiously over his shoulder before he removed the packet from his
pocket. Reasonable minds might differ about whether the furtive action of
appellant was sufficient to provide probable cause, but it is clear that the
court took into account the officer's personal knowledge that appellant was
a user of heroin and that the lounge was frequented by narcotics addicts.
Whether such personal knowledge of a policeman can form the basis of
probable cause for arrest is questionable. In United States v. Harris35 three
Justices agreed that such knowledge could be relied upon by an officer or
magistrate in evaluating the reliability of an informer's tip. But six Justices
refused to agree, and it is doubtful that a majority of the Court would now
accept the proposition that the policeman himself could rely on such personal knowledge in deciding whether there was probable cause to act. 86
G. Informant Reliability: Applications of Draperv. United States
In Draper v. United States37 corroboration of detailed information given
by an informer whose reliability had been previously established was found
to provide probable cause for arrest. The informant in that case had supplied many details, especially regarding Draper's personal appearance. 88
32. Id. at 310-11.
33. See notes 17-18 supra, and accompanying text.
34. 491 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
35. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).

36. Of the six Justices-Stewart, White, Harlan, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshallonly Justice Harlan is no longer on the Court.
37. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
38. The informant told officers that Draper would arrive by train in Denver on
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When these details were corroborated by the officers' observations, the Court
held that the officers had probable cause for arrest.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not required corroboration of
the same amount of detailed information for probable cause. In Harris v.
State89 officers received information that Harris would be arriving at a certain lounge, driving a certain car with specified license plates, carrying illegal
drugs. When Harris in fact arrived as predicted, the officers arrested him
inside the lounge, searched him without finding any contraband, and then
searched his car, in which contraband was found. The greater the detail
that is supplied by the informant, the greater is the likelihood that he has
personal knowledge of the facts which he has related to the police officer,
especially when the details are corroborated before the arrest. In the Harris case the paucity of detail relating only to Harris' car and arrival time
does not compare with the detail in Draper, in which the informant
described the appellant precisely as to height, age, weight, race, outer garment, trousers, shoes, style of walking, and the type of bag carried by appellant.
There is yet another distinction between Harris and Draper. While the
details given in Draper were corroborated at each step in the observation
and arrest, when Harris was searched personally nothing was found. As
there had been a failure of corroboration at that point, there was no justification for the continued restraint of Harris and the search of his car. The
court, however, found that there was still probable cause to search the car
and considered the question whether it was reasonable for the police to
search the car immediately instead of procuring a search warrant. The difficutly is, of course, that since the information supplied by the informant was
not confirmed by the presence of contraband on Harris, there simply was
no probable cause to search the car. If the drugs described by the informant had been found on Harris, arguably his arrest could have been justified
under the Draper rationale, but there would have been no probable cause
to believe that there were any drugs in the vehicle. There then would have
been the problem that no search of the car could have been conducted incident to a lawful arrest, and that there would have been no probable cause
for the search of the vehicle. 40 On the other hand, if there was no probable cause to arrest the appellant because of a failure to find drugs on 'him,
then the probable cause to search the vehicle also vanished, because probable cause in each instance depended on the same information supplied by
the informant.
In Fry v. State4' the court first reversed a conviction of burglary based
on evidence seized from the trunk of an automobile, but subsequently affirmed the conviction on the state's second motion for rehearing. Judge
the morning of the 8th or 9th of September, carrying a tan zipper bag and walking
very fast. He further described Draper as a Negro of light brown complexion, twentyseven years old, five feet eight inches tall, weighing 160 pounds, and wearing a light
colored raincoat, brown slacks, and black shoes. 358 U.S. at 309 and n.2.
39. 486 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
40. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
41. 493 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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Onion, speaking for two of the three judges of the final majority, purported
to rely on Draper in concluding that information given by a first-time informer (whose credibility had not been previously established) was sufficiently corroborated by what the officers found at the time of the arrest of
appellant to provide probable cause for search of the trunk of appellant's
car.
Several problems appear in Judge Onion's opinion. First, there is his assumption that the information given by the first-time informer would have
established probable cause for arrest but for the fact that the informant's
credibility had not been previously established. The difficulty is that it
is unclear exactly what information the police had at the time they arrested
Fry. Specifically, the several opinions raise a question whether the inform42
ant told the'bolice how he (the informant) obtained his information.
Another difficulty relates to Judge Onion's assumption that the arrest of
Fry was proper. When the police saw Fry's car parked in an alley behind
the drugstore which the informant had said was Fry's next target, they arrested Fry and searched the car. There they found a bracket for a radio
and some rings which the informant had mentioned. The informant's information was thus verified to that extent, but the verification occurred after
the arrest. Since, according to Judge Onion, the informant's credibility had
not been established, the only authority for the arrest was article 14.03,43
which provides for arrest of persons found in suspicious places under circumstances which reasonably show that a crime is imminent. But there is
no authority under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to arrest suspi44
cious persons.
The Fry decision cannot draw support from Draper. In the latter case
the reliability of the informant had been previously established, and corroboration of the informant's details only served to demonstrate his first-hand
knowledge. 45 In Fry, however, the informant's reliability was itself in question. The corroboration in Fry may 'have demonstrated informant's firsthand knowledge, but it did nothing to support his credibility and thus provide probable cause for arrest and search.
Finally, even if there had been probable cause to believe that the car
contained contraband, there was still no authority for the search. Judge
Onion failed to distinguish in his opinion between probable cause to stop
a moving vehicle and the exigencies which warrant immediate search of a
vehicle already stopped somewhere other than on a highway. The police
could easily have obtained a search warrant either before or after the arrest of Fry if their informant was as reliable as they contended. Without
46
a warrant the court should have found no authorization for the search.
42. In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the Court imposed the requirement,
inter alia, that the informant obtain his information in a reliable way.
43. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03 (Supp. 1973).
44. See notes 11-12 supra, and accompanying text. See also Papachristou v. City
of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972).
45. See notes 37-38 supra, and accompanying text.
46. Compare Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (a car may be
searched without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband
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H. Other Automobile Searches
Although the recent United States Supreme Court cases of United States
v. Robinson47 and Gustafson v. Florida48 have answered in the affirmative
the question whether the policeman who effects a full custodial arrest based
on a traffic offense can conduct a full search of the arrested person as an
incident to the arrest, questions remain with respect to the scope of that
search. In particular, there remains the question whether, or how much of,
the car itself can be searched under the Chime149 principle, particularly if
the arrested person gets out of the car before the policeman physically seizes
him.
In Walthall v. State5" the appellant was stopped for speeding. One of
the arresting officers saw a sawed-off shotgun between the bucket seats of
the car. Although the sawed-off shotgun was not short enough to make its
possession illegal, the court concluded that the officers had a right to look
for other weapons for their own protection. It is not entirely clear from
the court's opinion when the appellant got out of the car or whether this
shotgun was observed before the appellant got out. The court may have
believed that the sight of the sawed-off shotgun gave the officers probable
cause to arrest, but the court did not state this explicitly. During the course
of the search of appellant, a prescription bottle suspected of containing marijuana was found on the appellant. Presumably under the principle announced in Robinson and Gustafson, this could be seized. Of more doubtful
validity was the seizure of a bag of marijuana found under the seat. Again
it is not clear when this bag was seized. If it occurred after the appellant
got out of the car, then the question becomes whether it was within the
reach of appellant."' Another possibility, of course, is that once the marijuana was found on appellant, this gave the officers probable cause to believe that there was other contraband in the vehicle. Again, this was not
discussed by the court. Indeed, it appears that many of the issues that now
seem crucial in the light of Robinson and Gustafson were simply not discussed in Walthall.
Similar uncertainties are found in Pace v. Beto,52 a decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirming a district court decision that an unlawful search had been conducted by Texas police. Pace
had been arrested for running a red light and having a loud muffler. After
his car had been stopped, he got out and walked back to the police car.
His suspicions aroused by Pace's apparent nervousness, the officer searched
Pace's person and then moved toward his car to search it. When Pace tried
and there is a danger that it may be moved if not searched immediately), with Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (a car may be searched without warrant if there
is probable cause to believe it contains contraband).
47. 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973).
48. 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973).

49. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)

(incident to a lawful arrest search

may be made of the area in the immediate control of the defendant).

50. 488 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).

51. See note 49 supra, and accompanying text.

52. 469 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1972).
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to follow, the officer placed him in the squad car. Inside Pace's car the
officer found a matchbox in the glove compartment. When he started to
open it, Pace approached from behind and attempted to take the box away.
When the officer had again subdued Pace, he opened the matchbox and
found marijuana. Later, he found more marijuana in the trunk of the car.
The court concluded that, even if it was assumed that the search of the interior was justified as a search for weapons, the search for other items was
not justified. Thus, the court concluded that there was no justification for
opening the matchbox.
In the light of Robinson and Gustafson the proper result in Pace is far
from clear. First, it is not certain that the arresting officer intended to effect a full custody arrest, the only type of arrest discussed in Robinson and
Gustafson. If the officer merely intended to issue a citation for speeding
and for driving a car with a loud muffler, it is possible that no search of
the car was justified at all. Even if it is assumed that the officer did
intend to effect a full custody arrest, there still remains the question of the
scope of the vehicle search. The incident in Pace occurred prior to the decision in Chimel, but the question remains whether under these facts
a search would now be justified in view of the Chimel decision. Apart from
Chimel, there is a question whether containers found in a car can be opened.
Regardless of the rationale for search incident to arrest of the person, as
elaborated in Robinson and Gustafson, there surely is no probable cause to
believe that a person arrested for a traffic offense possesses narcotics in a
closed container in his vehicle.5 3 On the other hand, the Supreme Court's
apparent refusal in Robinson and Gustafson to pay much attention to the
justifications for searches and seizures, as outlined in Chimel, suggests that
in this situation also the Court might simply announce a flat rule authorizing such searches. There is nothing in Robinson or Gustafson that would
require a holding that a full custodial arrest of an individual for a traffic
offense justifies a full search of the car as well. It is possible, however,
that the problem in Pace will be treated as a problem of an inventory of
the car, although this would not require that each closed container be
opened. 54 In fact, there really is no need to search the automobile at all,
although, if the automobile were driven to the police station or some other
place, the driver would obviously see anything which was in plain view.
II.

CONFESSIONS AND OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE

In at least two cases 55 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reaffirmed
the proposition that under article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure5"
53. Cf. State v. Elkins, 245 Ore. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966).
54. The requirement that the contents of a car be inventoried does not necessarily
justify opening containers, since the arrested person could be given the option of signing a release, relieving the police of any liability for loss of items contained within
the containers found in the automobile. United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467, 487
n.7, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 454 n.7 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

55. Easley v. State, 493 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Butler v. State, 493

S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
56. TEX. CODE CalM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (Supp. 1973).
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certain oral confessions are inadmissible as evidence in Texas even though
they comply with the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona.5 '7 In particular,
the court ruled that, despite the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Harris v. New York 58 that a confession taken in violation of the Miranda
decision could still be used for impeachment purposes, an oral confession.
not taken in compliance with article 38.22 could not 'be so used.
In view of the foregoing, it is somewhat surprising to find that the Miranda decision itself has apparently not been fully recognized by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals. In Miles v. State 9 the defendant was convicted
of murder with malice. Part of the evidence against the defendant was a
statement made by him to police officers shortly after the murder. After
questioning several witnesses at the scene of the crime, two police officers
had gone to defendant's house and, by entering the front and rear doors
simultaneously, prevented defendant from leaving. The appeals court concluded that at that point defendant was under arrest. One officer then
asked defendant whether he had been at the scene of the crime, to which
he responded affirmatively. To the officer's next question as to what happened, defendant replied, "I cut the boys." 60 The appeals court upheld the
trial court's admission of the statement into evidence as part of the res gestae
of the offense, concluding: "This court has held innumerable times that
statements which are part of the res gestae are admissible notwithstanding
the fact that they may not be admissible as confessions or admissions, for
the rule of res gestae is independent of, superior to, and cannot be limited
by the rules relating to confessions or admissions after arrest.""'
This may be a proper statement of the law of Texas, but it does not answer the question -whether the principle in Miranda has 'been violated. It
may 'be true, as a commentator has suggested, that a spontaneous exclamation, as an exception to the hearsay rule, may occur even in apparent response to a question.6 2 Nevertheless, the facts of this case show that the
answers given were responsive answers to specific questions. It was not a
case in which one innocuous question was asked and an unresponsive incriminating answer followed. The first question had to do with the whereabouts
of the appellant at a certain time. The reply was brief and totally responsive. In answer to the second question regarding what had happened the
appellant responded that he had "cut the boys." If this is not interrogation,
it is difficult to imagine what is. The court concluded that appellant was
under arrest at this time. If words have any meaning, this was the kind
of custodial interrogation to which Miranda applies. 63 In the light of the
supremacy clause,6 4 the fact that the Texas rule may permit admission of
such testimony does not make the evidence constitutionally admissible. Miles
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
488 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
Id. at 791.
Id. at 792.
C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
U.S. CONST. art. VI.

EVIDENCE

706 (2d ed. 1972).
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should be contrasted with Hood v. State,6 5 in which the appellant, "while
seated in a police car after the shooting, yelled out, 'Yes, I shot the M.F.I shot him.'-"66 The court was on much firmer ground in ruling in Hood
that the evidence was properly admissible, since the statement was clearly
spontaneous and not in response to any question.
Another example of insensitivity to defendant's fifth amendment rights is
found in Thomas v. State.67 In this murder case a police officer was permitted to testify regarding what an eye witness had said to the officer in
the presence of the defendant, who was then not under arrest. The court
held that this evidence was properly admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule 'because a statement was made calling for a response, and the defendant's silence was the equivalent of an admission. The difficulty here
is that, although there was no duty on the part of the officer to warn the
defendant that he had a right to remain silent since he was not in custody,
the defendant had no duty to respond since he was obviously a suspect because of the accusatory nature of the statement to which he did not
respond. 68 As the Supreme Court cases dealing with the fifth amendment
have made clear, a person in the presence of a police officer has no duty
to respond or to incriminate himself.6 9 Under the circumstances, the rule
as applied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has the effect of penalizing the exercise of a constitutional right.
In Corbett v. State70 the court applied the res gestae exception to the
hearsay rule under the following circumstances. Appellant allegedly struck
the deceased with a lead pipe while the deceased was on the telephone talking to someone at a bank about checks which appellant, an employee of
the deceased, had written. Just prior to the phone conversation appellant
and deceased had argued about these checks. At trial the deceased's wife
was permitted to testify regarding a conversation between the deceased and
her concerning these checks just before the deceased departed on his fatal
trip to appellant's residence. The court concluded that the wife's testimony
was properly admissible as an explanation of her husband's meeting with
the appellant. The problem remains, however, that there was no apparent
spontaneity. At least the court did not refer to any facts which established
any particular spontaneity which would distinguish this conversation from
the ordinary conversations which clearly are not admissible under the hearsay rule. Unless there were facts present which the court did not allude
to, the ruling in this case logically could mean that any conversation about
65. 490 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
66. Id. at 550.
67. 488 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
68. "He [the police officer] testified that Minnie Patton stated to him that the appellant walked up to Coleman and started arguing with him for no apparent reason,
pulled a knife from under his shirt and stabbed him, and that two boys then took the
knife and ran off with it. Before the stabbing, the appellant told Coleman that he
was not 'king of the block' and that he (the appellant) was going to kill him." Id.
at 778.
69. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467
(1966).
70. 493 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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a subsequent event which becomes important in litigation is admissible as
part of the res gestae and explanatory of the subsequent transaction to which
the conversation has referred.

M.
In a number of

cases 7'

GUILTY PLEA PROCEDURES

the court of criminal appeals has made it clear

that a guilty plea cannot stand unless the court before which the plea is
entered inquires whether the defendant pleading guilty "is uninfluenced by
any consideration of fear, or by any persuasion, or delusive hope of pardon,
prompting him to confess his guilt."' 72 The court has also held, however,
that the exact language of article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
need not be followed. 73 Indeed, as one of the judges has argued, 74 a simple
inquiry into the question whether the person is pleading guilty because he
has been threatened or because he has been promised anything which might
be helpful, may be more understandable to the average defendant than
7
the esoteric language of article 26.13. 5
76
In Williams v. State the court of criminal appeals upheld the lower
court's refusal to permit the appellant to withdraw her plea of guilty to the
offense of possession of marijuana prior to sentencing. There was a conflict
in testimony as to precisely what had been promised appellant prior to the
entry of the plea. Appellant's testimony was that "two officers promised
her in the presence of Assistant District Attorney Guyton that she would
get probation; that she was told by the officers the only reason her case
was coming to court was so as to not arouse suspicion and that they were
satisfied with her cooperation." 77 There was also testimony that appellant's
counsel had informed her "that the court was reluctant to grant probation
'78
and that the court only promised to order a pre-sentence investigation.
There was even testimony that appellant was informed prior to the entry
of the plea that the decision whether to grant probation was solely that of
the judge. But the appeals court found decisive appellant's negative response to the trial court's article 26.13 admonishment and further inquiries
as to promises of probation, despite appellant's later testimony that she responded negatively merely because she thought that to do so was a required
formality.
This attachment of importance to the formal denial of promises or threats
is to be contrasted with the treatment of such formal denials in Hilliard v.
71. See, e.g., Prudhomme v. State, 495 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973);
Heathcock v. State, 494 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Jefferson v. State, 486
S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
72. Tax. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (Supp. 1973).
73. Clayton v. State, 493 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Mitchell v. State,
493 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Espinosa v. State, 493 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973); Jackson.v. State, 488 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
74. Mitchell v. State, 493 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (Douglas, J.).
75. The court has also rejected the contention that article 26.13 requires that the
defendant pleading guilty be advised of the possibility of the use of his conviction for
enhancement purposes. Green v. State, 491 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
76. 487 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
77. Id. at 364.
78. Id. at 365.
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Beto.79 In Hilliard a federal district court had dismissed an application for
habeas corpus without requiring an evidentiary hearing, relying on petitioner's formal denial that he had been influenced by threats or promises.

In vacating the judgment of the district court and remanding for an evidentiary hearing, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the de-

fendant's denial of promises or inducements during the guilty plea hearing
did not completely foreclose further inquiry.80

As it is common knowledge

that formal denials often accompany plea bargaining, 81 the court in Hilliard
seems to have taken a much more realistic approach than the court in Williams.
IV.

FAILURE ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL To PRESERVE ERROR ON
APPEAL-INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The court of criminal appeals has continued to refuse to review certain
matters on appeal when the matters below were not properly preserved for
appeal. Two common examples are the failure of counsel to submit written
objections to jury instructions8 2 and the failure of counsel to accompany a
motion for continuance with the defendant's own affidavit. 8s
The requirement that objections to jury instructions be in writing serves
no useful purpose.8 4 It may be that at a time when verbatim transcripts
were rare if not unknown, such written objections aided the court on appeal.
Now, however, when court stenographers prepare verbatim transcripts, the
79. 465 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972).
80. See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), in which the United
States Supreme Court vacated a lower court decision upholding a conviction based on
the guilty plea, because it appeared that the state had failed to adhere to a bargain
agreed upon with the petitioner. The case arose in part because the agreement was
not disclosed to the judge at the time the plea of guilty was entered. Had this been
done, the attorney who represented the state at the time of the entry of the plea of
guilty would not have been unaware of the bargain entered into by another attorney
of the state.
81. The proposed rule 11 of the Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 52 F.R.D. 409, 416-18 (1971), would require disclosure of any such agreement in open court and hence would obviate many
of the difficulties resulting from the present sham procedure. Cf. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
PROCEDURE 169 (2d tent.

ON

UNIFORM STATE LAWS,

UNIFORM

RULES OF

CRIMINAL

draft 1973). For quite a number of years both the United
States Army and Navy have dealt specifically with the problem of plea bargaining by
requiring that an agreement be in writing, considered by the trial court in open court,
and appended to the record of trial on appeal. For a description of the procedure in

the Army, see

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

MILITARY JUDGES' GUIDE

3-3 (D.A. Pam.

27-9, May 1969); DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL PROCEDURE 14-7 to -8 (Draft D.A. Pam. 27-173 Revised, January 1973).
82. See, e.g., McClennon v. State, 492 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Murry
v. State, 491 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Wood v. State, 486 S.W.2d 771
(Tex. Crim. App. 1972). In a related case, Joiner v. State, 494 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1973), a court of civil appeals rejected the appellant's complaint that the
trial court failed to charge on the presumption of innocence. The court relied on the
fact that the appellant's counsel had not requested such a charge of the court. In the
light of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), in which the Court held that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an essential of due process, it would seem
that the sort of error complained of is so fundamental that no objection should be necessary in order to raise it. In view of the fundamental nature of the presumption of
innocence, the court should be bound, sua sponte, to give such an instruction.
83. Sellers v. State, 492 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
84. See Parrot v. Tallahassee, 381 U.S. 129 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415 (1965). But cf. Monger v. Florida, 405 U.S. 958 (1972).
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failure to submit a written objection to a charge does not make review by
an appellate court impossible. It is also difficult to see how the failure to
submit written objections would materially affect the trial court's ability to
understand the nature of the objections. If there were some confusion, the
court could certainly clarify the situation through interrogation of counsel.
It is even more difficult to understand the need to have the defendant
himself swear to the motion for continuance. Under the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense
Function the question of continuances is a matter of trial strategy within
the complete discretion of defense counsel.8 5 The defendant is not sufficiently familiar with the law and with matters of trial strategy to
know whether a continuance is proper. Therefore, it seems totally unnecessary to have the defendant personally swear to a motion for continuance.
Perhaps the only purpose served by the above-described procedural requirements is to lighten the workload of the overburdened court of criminal
appeals. This may be understandable from a practical standpoint, but it
is hardly consistent with the pursuit of justice. It is also arguable that such
efforts to avoid a consideration of questions of this sort may merely result
in further reliance upon collateral relief, first in the Texas courts, and then
in the federal courts unless the applicant has "deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts." 86 It would be hard to argue that there
has been a deliberate bypass or evasion of the orderly adjudication of defenses when defense counsel has objected to an instruction or has moved
for a continuance, albeit not in compliance with the formal requisites of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 87
The court of criminal appeals has also found that any possible error in
the admission of evidence illegally seized is rendered harmless when the defendant takes the stand and testifies with reference to the evidence seized.88
This particular approach seems inconsistent with the result reached in Harrison v. United States,89 in which the United States Supreme Court ruled inadmissible former testimony of the defendant, because that former testimony was merely a response to the admission into evidence at the first
trial of a confession unlawfully obtained. In other words, the United States
Supreme Court was not willing in Harrison to penalize a defendant for action taken in response to illegal activity on the part of the state.
There is thus insufficient justification for the enforcement of the procedural rules referred to above. However, as the Texas Court of Criminal
85.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS

TION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION

RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNC-

162-63 (approved draft 1971).

86. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
87. Even on direct review by the United States Supreme Court, a failure to comply with a state procedural rule will not necessarily prevent review by the United States

Supreme Court unless that rule can be said to constitute "independent and adequate
state grounds." Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446 (1965). Such a procedural
rule will not be considered an adequate state ground unless the procedural rule serves
a legitimate state interest. An argument can certainly be made on the basis of what
has been said that no legitimate state interest is served by the rules referred to above.

But cf. Monger v. Florida, 405 U.S. 958 (1972).

88. McComb v. State, 488 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).

89. 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
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Appeals has frequently enforced these rules the question arises whether a
defendant has obtained effective assistance of counsel if his defense counsel
has consistently failed to take the kinds of steps which, the court has made
plain, are necessary to preserve error on appeal. In Taylor v. State90 a conviction of murder without malice was upheld by the court. On appeal objections were raised concerning the admissibility of an oral confession, the
absence of expert testimony regarding the cause of death, the failure of the
trial court to require recordation and transcription of all proceedings, and
erroneous jury instructions. With the exception of the objection regarding
lack of expert testimony, all the objections were summarily rejected by the
court because counsel at trial had failed to take the steps necessary to preserve the issues for appeal. Moreover, with respect to the issue regarding
failure to record and transcribe the voir dire and jury argument, appellant's
counsel on appeal relied on a federal statute inapplicable to state proceedings. The court nowhere discussed the question of effective assistance of
counsel.
The Taylor case may be compared with Gomez v. Beto,91 in which the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found, as a matter of law, a denial
of effective assistance of counsel because of the failure of counsel at trial
to investigate the question of alibi, which was raised by the defendant. The
defendant had not only maintained an alibi, but also given his defense counsel the names of witnesses -whocould support it.
V.

EXTRANEOUS OFFENSES

In Ford v. State9 2 the court reversed a felony-murder conviction based
on a homicide which occurred in the course of a robbery because of the
erroneous admission of evidence concerning another robbery. The court
had occasion to review the principles involved in the admission of extraneous
offenses, particularly when used to prove identity. The court stated the rule
that "[e]vidence of another crime is admissible to prove identity, when identity is an issue, only if there is some distinguishing characteristic common
to both the extraneous offense and the offense for which the accused is on
trial. .

.

. In the case of identity, similarity is required as a basis for the

inference to be drawn from the evidence of the former crime."' 3 The court
found that although there were some similarities, 9 4 the dissimilarities were
very great. The court pointed to the fact that one was a robbery of a chemical company, whereas the other was a robbery of a supermarket; the robbery of the chemical company was by one individual, whereas the robbery
of the supermarket was by four individuals; the chemical company robbery
was committed when the perpetrator pretended to seek employment,
whereas there was no evidence regarding the method used in the supermar90. 489 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
91. 462 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1972).
92. 484 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).

93. Id. at 729.
94. The color of the shirt or sweater allegedly worn by appellant was the same

in both cases, and both times weapons were discharged.
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ket robbery. On these facts the court found an insufficient similarity to justify the admission of the extraneous offense to prove identity.
In other cases the court also reversed convictions because of erroneous
admission of extraneous offenses. 95 In Rodriguez v. State,96 for example,
the court reversed a murder conviction because the state introduced evidence
of another killing on the theory that the two were similar because of an
absence of motive in each case. The court found that such a similarity
amounted to nothing more than an assertion that, because the defendant was
a bad person and killed in one instance, he would also kill in another instance.
Granato v. State97 is a good illustration of the proper admission of an
extraneous offense to show fraudulent intent. In this case, involving
a charge of theft by false pretext, the state attempted to show that the appellant fraudulently misrepresented the amount of collateral available to secure a loan. When questioned about the collateral by a bank official, appellant insisted that his wife had merely made a mistake in addition on
the original list of collateral. At trial evidence was introduced to the effect
that about ten months after the principal transaction the appellant borrowed
money from another bank by misrepresenting the collateral, which misrepresentation he again blamed on his wife, using the same excuse. The similarity of the two transactions in Granato, showing an apparent modus operandi, clearly bears upon the question whether appellant was truthful in
his assertion that a mere mistake had been made, and the trial court so
held. 98
In several other cases, however, the court has arguably misapplied the
principle of extraneous offenses. In Lee v. State9 9 the appellant was
charged with the offense of selling heroin. After an undercover agent had
testified that he purchased heroin from the appellant on a particular day,
the appellant denied the commission of the offense entirely and claimed that
he had been at his brother's house at the time of the alleged transaction.
The appellant contended on appeal that the trial court erred in permitting
,the agent to testify regarding another alleged sale of heroin to an informer
by appellant. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the appellant's denial of sale raised an issue regarding the identity of the seller and
that the testimony regarding the second sale was relevant to disprove appellant's assertion that he had never sold heroin to the agent or anyone else.
The difficulty with the court's reliance on the principle that an extraneous
offense may be introduced to show identity is that there was no showing,
apart from appellant's alleged participation in both transactions, that the two
transactions were in any way similar. An extraneous offense is admissible
95. See, e.g., Newman v. State, 485 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Rogers
v. State, 484 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
96. 486 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
97. 493 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
98. Another example of the proper admission of extraneous offenses is Moulton
v. State, 486 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
99. 496 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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only when it is shown that the same person has committed both the principal
offense and the extraneous offense. 10 0 There must be enough similarities
between the two offenses to show that the same person committed both. No
such similarities were described in Lee.
Superficially, proof of the extraneous offense refuted appellant's claim
that he had never sold heroin to the informer or anyone else. However,
in most extraneous offense situations the extraneous offense is in some way
supportive of the principal offense in part because third parties are witnesses
to the extraneous offense. So, for example, where the question is one of
identity, the fact that the other persons also identified the appellant in extremely similar situations suggests that the witnesses with respect to the principal offense were correct in their identification.' 0' In Lee, however, the
witness to each offense was the same informer, and in both cases it was
the informer's word against the appellant's. If the informer was wrong as
to the principal offense, he might also have been wrong as to the extraneous
offense. Hence, in Lee the evidence of the extraneous offense did not further the search for truth, which is the only justification for the admission
of such otherwise prejudicial evidence.' 02
VI.

PROBATION AND PAROLE REVOCATION

A.

ProceduralAspects

Since the United States Supreme Court decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,108
which imposed upon the states the same limitations with respect to probation revocation as it had previously applied to parole revocation in Morrissey v. Brewer,104 the question arises whether Texas probation revocation
procedures satisfy the new constitutional standards. On its face, article
42.12, section 8, of the Code of Criminal Procedure'0 5 fails to satisfy the
requirement imposed in Gagnon that there be a preliminary hearing as well
as a final hearing on the question of revocation. Whether the Texas procedure satisfies the constitutional requirements because the alleged violator
of probation is apparently kept in jail pending a hearing before the court
and not sent to the 'penitentiary, and because the hearing proper is before
a judge rather than some lesser neutral personage, remains to be seen.' 0 6
100. See note 93 supra, and accompanying text.

101. This point is illustrated by Ford v. State, 484 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972), note 92 supra, and accompanying text. In Ford, although the court found that

evidence of another offense was improperly admitted, the extraneous offense sought to
be admitted was witnessed by persons other than those who witnessed the principal offense.
102. Other cases in which there has been a questionable application of the extraneous offense principle are Avilla v. State, 493 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Gil-

Ion v. State, 492 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); and Sanchez v. State, 492 S.W.
2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
103. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
104. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
105. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 8 (Supp. 1973).
106. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court indicated that it was
requiring a preliminary bearing because of the time lag between arrest of the parolee
and revocation of his parole and because a parolee is often removed from the location
of the alleged parole violation to a penitentiary before revocation. To the extent that
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One other requirement of Gagnon which is arguably not now being met
under Texas case law is that the hearing body provide, at the end of the
hearing, "a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied
on and the reasons for revoking [probation or] parole. '10 7 In Stafford v.
State'0 s three grounds for revocation of probation were alleged. The probationer urged on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to justify revocation
on one of the three stated grounds. The court refused to inquire into the
sufficiency of the evidence for revocation because the appellant had
neglected to request written findings of fact. The court's reliance on the
appellant's failure to request findings as a ground for not considering his
allegation of insufficiency thus conflicts with the requirements of Gagnon.
Although not directly relating to probation or parole revocation, the ruling
in Cazares v. State'0 9 does at least deal with the relationship between the
parole officer and the probationer or parolee. In this case the appellant,
charged with possession of heroin, argued that an exception to the hearsay
rule ought to be recognized with respect to exculpatory statements made by
him to his parole officer. The court rejected this contention on the grounds
that "[tihe effect of such a rule would be to encourage fabrication and deter
the necessary candid relationship between the parolee and his parole officer." 11 0 While it is true that courts have assumed that there exists a candid
relationship between the probationer or parolee and his parole officer and
that everything ought to be done to encourage the maintenance of this relationship,"' the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has had no hesitancy in
holding statements made to parole officers by parolees or probationers admissible against the parolee or probationer in hearings to revoke the parole
or probation.1 12 In fact, the parole officer is often the one who initiates
revocation proceedings. This is hardly conducive to a close relationship, especially when statements made by the probationer to his officer can be used
against him but not in his favor. The privilege ought to apply both ways,
and all such statements should be inadmissible.
B.

Substantive Aspects

In numerous cases the court has upheld revocation of probation for seemingly trivial activities almost totally unrelated to the principal offense. For
the Court was relying on the removal of the defendant from the spot of the alleged
violation, the Texas procedure would seem to satisfy this aspect of the rule.
Although the identity of the persons deciding the question of revocation was not
mentioned by the Court in Morrissey in connection with the question of the preliminary hearing, it is not inconceivable that a court would say that since the Texas procedure gives the parolee something to which he is not constitutionally entitled-i.e., a
hearing before a court as opposed to an administrative official-the failure to provide
a preliminary hearing is somehow less significant. Functionally, such an argument
would make no sense if there were a substantial time lag between the arrest and the
parole revocation hearing.
107. 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973).
108. 487 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
109. 488 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
110. Id. at 457.
111. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
112. Cunningham v. State, 488 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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example, the court has revoked probation for public intoxication or for failure to meet with the parole officer, even though these activities are unrelated to charges such as burglary or murder. 1 3 While the court conducting
the probation revocation hearing is clearly authorized by statute to revoke
probation for such reasons, 1 4 the question remains whether the legislature
ought to change this by requiring that revocation be permitted only when
the probationer has committed a serious criminal act or has engaged in the
same conduct that resulted in the principal conviction. The theoretical purpose of probation is not to make certain the eventual confinement of the
probationer but rather to give the individual a second chance by permitting
him to remain relatively free in society." 3 The probationer, who has already demonstrated his fallibility, should not be required to adhere to standards stricter than -those applied to other people. Most people are not required to "avoid injurious or vicious habits" or to "work faithfully at suitable employment as far as possible." 1 6 While probation ought to involve
the imposition and enforcement of certain standards of behavior," 17 it does
not follow -that a person should be required to serve out his full sentence
merely because he failed to visit his probation officer or made the mistake
of becoming drunk in public. It seems that the imposition of such onerous
and vague conditions, with the concomitant exercise of unfettered discretion
by the trial judge, is simply a device by which persons who are thought
to be "bad," but against whom there is insufficient evidence of a substantial offense, can be sent to the penitentiary without proof of the commission of such an offense. The exercise of such unfettered discretion is the
antithesis of the rule of law. 1 8 Moreover, the example of apparently arbitrary revocation of probation is not likely to contribute to the eventual rehabilitation of the probationer.
VII.

REASONABLE DOUBT

In several cases the court's instruction on reasonable doubt has created
a certain amount of semantic confusion."19 Article 38.03 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure 20 requires the state to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
113. See Smith v. State, 494 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (revocation for
driving while intoxicated, the principal offense being burglary); Martinez v. State, 493
S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (revocation for driving while intoxicated, the prin-

cipal offense being murder without malice); Szczeck v. State, 490 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973) (revocation for failure to meet with probation officer, the principal
offense being burglary).
114. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 42.12, §§ 6, 8 (Supp. 1973).
115. See AMERICAN BAR ASSoCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION
(approved draft 1970).
116. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 6 (1966).

1,

15-16

117. The legislature might provide as a sanction for the violation of a less serious
condition of probation that the probationer be imprisoned for a period of several days.
118. "The first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules is an obvious one: there must be rules. This may be stated as the
requirement of generality." L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46 (rev. ed. 1969). Cf.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 250
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. See, e.g., Randolph v. State, 493 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Gordon
v. State, 492 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
120. TEX. CODE GRM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.03 (1966).
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doubt that a crime has been committed. Failure to carry this burden results
in the acquittal of the defendant. But when the jury is instructed to acquit
if it finds that the defendant did not commit the offense or if it has a reasonable doubt thereof,1 21 it is unclear whether the burden is on the state
to prove guilt or on the defendant to prove innocence. The phrase "reasonable doubt of innocence" would make sense only if the burden were on the
defendant to prove his innocence and if his failure to do so would result
in his conviction. As this is clearly not the statutory or constitutional rule
in Texas,' 22 this instruction should be abandoned in favor of the usual instruction that the jury must acquit if the state fails to prove its case beyond
a reasonable doubt.
VIII.

PRESUMPTIONS AND PERMISSIBLE INFERENCES

In Gardner v. State the court, in assessing the sufficiency of evidence to
support a burglary conviction, stated that "[u]nexplained possession of property recently stolen from burglarized buildings is sufficient to support conviction for burglary.' 23 This statement regarding unexplained possession
was arguably dictum, since there was other evidence that connected the defendant with the burglary. It is noteworthy, however, that the court appeared willing to apply this permissible inference to a situation in which the
unexplained possession occurred two or three days after the burglary. This
raises the question of the constitutionality of this permissible inference in
24
light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Barnes v. United States.
The Court there upheld an instruction that "ordinarily [the jury] would be
justified in inferring from unexplained possession of recently stolen mail that
the defendant possessed the mail with knowledge that it was stolen."' 25 In
so doing, the Court required that there be a rational connection between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. According to the Court
any inference of guilt from unexplained possession is irrational, and hence
unconstitutional, unless "it can at least be said with substantial assurance that
the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on
which it is made to depend.' 2 As it is common knowledge that people
who burglarize very often sell what they have obtained, the passage of two
or three days suggests the possibility of sale of the stolen goods to the defendant. How, therefore, can it be said to be more likely than not that
a person in unexplained possession of goods two or three days after they
121. An example of a jury instruction containing this ambiguity is found in Randolph v. State, 493 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973):

You are further instructed that if you believe that Sylvester Randolph
was not acting together with the said Earl Mabry in robbing, or attempt-

ing to rob LeRoy Thompson, if he did, or if Sylvester Randolph had not

previously entered into an agreement with the said Earl Mabry to rob,
or attempt to rob the said LeRoy Thompson, if they did, or if you have
a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the Defendant, Sylvester Randolph.
122. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.03
(1966).
123. 486 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
124. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).

125. Id. at 838.
126. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.6,36 (1969).
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were taken in a burglary was guilty of the burglary? Even if the person
in possession had knowledge of the manner in which the goods were obtained and could thus be convicted of theft under the new Texas Penal
Code, 127 such an offense is quite different from the more serious offense
8
of burglary.12
An even more questionable use of a presumption is illustrated by Stills
v. State.1" 9 Stills was convicted of murder without malice on evidence showing that he shot the deceased with a .22 calibre pistol. Because he testified
that he did not intend to kill the deceased, Stills claimed on appeal that
the lower court erred in not giving a charge to the jury on the lesser included
offense of aggravated assault. The court said:
The appellant admits firing the pistol at the deceased. A pistol is a
deadly weapon per se. When a deadly weapon is fired at close range
and death results, the law presumes an intent to kill. The intent to
kill being presumed, the issue of aggravated assault was not raised.
• . . The appellant's testimony under these circumstances, that he did
not intend to kill the deceased nor anyone else, does not require that
the charge of aggravated assault be given. 180
The reasoning of the court suggests that no verdict other than murder with
or without malice would have been possible, although the testimony regarding intent seemed to raise the issue of negligent homicide. Thus, the language quoted from Stills suggests that a jury is not merely permitted to infer
from the use of a deadly weapon that there was an intent to kill, but rather
required to find an intent to kill when a deadly weapon was fatally used.
This amounts to an irrebuttable presumption; in effect, it precludes the jury
from believing the defendant when he says that he did not intend to kill.
Surely there may be circumstances in which a defendant may use a deadly
weapon and not intend to kill. For example, if the defendant were an expert in the use of handguns and intended merely to frighten the victim by
hitting a spot a few inches away from the victim, but tripped over a chair
as he fired, there would be some merit to his contention that he did not
intend to kill."' Nonetheless, this ruling by the court would prevent the
jury from finding an intent not to kill; in effect, it would be an instruction
to disregard the testimony of the defendant, thus creating an irrebuttable
2
presumption of doubtful constitutional validity."3
127. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 31.02-.03 (Supp. 1973).
128. Id. § 30.02.
129. 492 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
130. Id. at 479.
131. Under the new Penal Code this offense certainly could not be more than involuntary manslaughter and possibly only criminally negligent homicide. For a crime
to be murder under § 19.02, there would have to be an intention to kill, an intention
to cause serious bodily injury, or felony murder. The offense would be involuntary
manslaughter under § 19.03 if it were committed "recklessly," but only criminally negligent homicide if death resulted through criminal negligence. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.02, 19.04, 19.06 (Supp. 1973). In view of the expertise of the defendant, this
might be a close question of fact for the jury. If the defendant were not an expert but
nevertheless intended not to hit the victim but merely to frighten him, this non-expert
might be guilty only of involuntary manslaughter by reason of his reckless act, causing
the death of the victim.
132. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973).
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OBSCENITY

Volumes could, and probably will, be written about the new United States
Supreme Court obscenity rulings in Miller v. California"3 and related
cases. 1 4 The first effort by a Texas appellate court to apply the rulings
in Miller occurred in Richard v. State.1s5 The court of civil appeals reviewed a lower court injunction entered under section 13 of article 527 of
the Penal Code, 13 which injunction prohibited (a) the showing or distribution of nine specific films, (b) the showing or distribution of any other
obscene material in violation of article 527, and (c) any sale or exhibition
of films depicting males and females engaging in actual sexual intercourse,
oral sodomy, anal sodomy, and cunnilingus. The appellate court reviewed
the films and found them to be obscene under any definition of the term.
Eschewing a detailed description, the court said merely that "from the first
to the last scene, each film is a filthy, cynical, disgusting portrayal of explicit
sexual activity."' 187 The court did, however, strike down the section of the
injunction forbidding other violations of article 527 as a "'prior restraint'
with a vengeance and without any precise guidelines to govern the defendants' future conduct.' 38 On the other hand, the court did uphold the section forbidding the exhibition of films showing specified acts on the ground
that the activity prohibited was very explicit. The court, however, limited
the section "to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and
which, taken as a whole, do not have any serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value."' 9
Following Miller the states may prohibit distribution and exhibition of
films which arguably could not have been prohibited under Memoirs 40 or
133. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200Ft. Reels of Super 8-mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S.
115 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Five days after
these decisions were handed down the Supreme Court decided three other cases dealing
with procedural issues in the obscenity area: Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836
(1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483
(1973).
135. 497 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973).
136. Act of June 14, 1971, ch. 887, § 3, [1971] Tex. Acts 2725 (repealed 1973).
Despite the repeal of this section there remains ostensible authority to enjoin distribution of obscene films. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4667 (Supp. 1973).
137. 497 S.W.2d at 778.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 782.
140. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Under the plurality opinion in Memoirs the test
for obscene material was:
[I]t must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; (b) the material
is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Id. at 418. The test announced in Miller is:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . , (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
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they may adhere to the old standard. Although Texas has not yet adapted
its penal code to the new Miller standards, it appears after Richard that
Miller has been adopted judicially.
An additional question in Richard is why the state sought an injunction
when the behavior to be enjoined was already proscribed under the criminal
law. The answer may lie in the difference between the procedure employed
in a criminal trial and that employed in a show-cause hearing to determine
whether a person is to be held in contempt for violating an injunction. A
jury trial is required in the former but not in the latter.14' This procedure
sanctioned in Richard thus denies a defendant a jury trial on what is for
all other purposes an obscenity charge. This denial of jury trial aggravates
the plight of the obscenity defendant, as described by Justice Douglas in his
dissent in Miller. The holding of that case allows a criminal conviction for
violation of an obscenity statute, despite the vagueness of the obscenity doctrine, with the defendant having been given no advance notice that the film
which he has exhibited is violative of the statute.' 42 Under Richard the
but also will not have
defendant will not only fail to receive advance 4notice,
3
the benefit of a jury determination of obscenity.'
Whether a contempt proceeding brought for violation of an injunction
such as the one in Richard would pass constitutional muster under the first
amendment decisions of the United States Supreme Court is unclear. 44 The
Richard injunction closely resembles the unconstitutional permanent injunction prohibiting the publication of the periodical, "The Saturday Press," in
45
Near v. Minnesota.1
X.

CONCLUSION

No one who has read this Article can fail to notice the generally negative
assessment of the work of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals contained
herein. In my view, part of the problem is institutional: The court is overworked. The current effort to draft a new state constitution provides an
opportunity to restructure the judiciary. In particular, there is an urgent
need to merge the Court of Criminal Appeals with the Supreme Court of
Texas and to allow the several courts of civil appeals to become intermediate
courts within the integrated judicial system. Additionally, merit selection
of judges would improve the quality of Texas courts by making it more
likely that persons with varying backgrounds and philosophies would sit on
the appellate courts.
413 U.S. at 24. Whether the standard set forth in Miller is any clearer than the standard set forth in Memoirs is questionable. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.

49, 83 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc.
re Allison, 48 Tex. Crim. 634, 639, 90 S.W. 492, 495 (1905).
142.

ANN.

art. 1.05 (1966); In

413 U.S. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

143. That the guaranty of a jury trial in obscenity cases is no mere formality is
illustrated by the recent jury acquittal of a defendant who was charged with a violation of the obscenity statute because of his showing of "The Last Tango in Paris."
State v. Boyd, No. 56982 (County Court-at-Law, Lubbock County, Texas, Nov. 12,
1973).
144. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).

145. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

